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RESUMEN
Las crisis financieras no son un feno´meno reciente. ?Son todas las crisis
parecidas?, ?han sido las crisis ma´s frecuentes, largas y severas en el siglo XX?,
?que´ nos muestra la historia? El objetivo de este trabajo es estudiar las crisis
financieras en Espan˜a en los u´ltimos 150 an˜os. Se han considerado diferentes
tipos de crisis (bancarias, de tipo de cambio y bursa´tiles), ası´ como sus posibles
combinaciones, se ha estimado la frecuencia de las crisis en varios perı´odos y
se ha medido su duracio´n e intensidad. La principal conclusio´n obtenida es que
las crisis financieras en Espan˜a han sido ma´s frecuentes que en el resto del
mundo y desde 1973 han sido tambie´n ma´s severas y ma´s complejas, como esta´
confirmando la crisis que estallo´ en 2007.
Palabras clave: Espan˜a, historia financiera, crisis bancarias, crisis
cambiarias, crisis bursa´tiles
1. INTRODUCTION
The financial disturbances that originated in the United States in
the second half of 2007, with the collapse of Bear Stearns, and then in 2008 with
the catastrophic bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, are the latest in a series of
episodes in various regions of the world in recent years. Financial crises,
however, are not unique to current financial systems, history being full of
banking and exchange rate crises. For those who have studied the history of
money, financial crises are not a surprising phenomenon at all. Financial
instability and crises are part of economic life, as stated by Minsky (1977).
Chancellor (1999), in his book on financial speculation, documented how
financial crises have stretched back at least as far as Ancient Rome, during the
2nd century BC. Kindleberger (2000) provided a list of financial crises from the
Dutch tulip mania in 1636 to the Asian crisis in 1997 and the subsequent
Russian and Brazilian crises in 1998. Goodhart and Delargy (1998) created a
useful table of international stock exchange shocks between 1873 and 1932 for
major countries, characterising each shock according to size and international
impact. Bordo (1986) also provided a catalogue of crises, distinguishing
between banking crises that interrupted the internal payment system and cur-
rency crises that disrupted external payment relations. More recently, Reinhart
and Rogoff (2009) constructed an impressive data set of banking and financial
crises around the entire world dating back to 1800. From a historical viewpoint,
crises are depressingly familiar.
How many crises (banking, currency, stock market crashes) have occur-
red in Spain? Did they become more frequent, longer lasting or more severe
as we moved from the nineteenth into the 20th century? What do we know
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about Spanish crises? The purpose of this paper is precisely to look into
historical records to answer these questions.
Although this study is confined to a single country, we believe it is worth
examining a country-specific historical experience in depth. First, it is diffi-
cult to compile detailed and high-quality data when a large sample of
countries is considered. In contrast, single-country analyses make it possible
to use the best available data for a country. Second, a country-specific time-
series study can perform in-depth analyses in order to test empirical hypotheses
regarding the main determinants of financial crises; moreover, it avoids some of
the cross-country study limitations, particularly their inability to control for the
idiosyncratic characteristics of countries, such as: institutions, technology,
factor endowments, etc. Another unique feature of this paper is that it considers
different types of financial crises and their combinations: banking, currency and
stock market crises. The study is carried out to ascertain whether one type of
crisis has become more or less prevalent and also to detect any possible inter-
action between crises. This is a new approach in regard to other studies, which
consider banking and currency crises and a combination of the two on the one
hand, and stock market crises on the other1.
Although there are various monographic studies of the main Spanish
financial crises, none of them offer a quantitative measure of frequency,
duration or severity2. Neither is there any empirical research comparing the
different crises. We do not know whether Spanish financial crises in the past
were longer and deeper or entailed larger output losses than in more recent
times. Nor do we know which of the three types of crises, banking, currency or
stock market, were the most frequent or which occurred at the same time (any
possible combination) and whether these combinations made crises more
disruptive and severe. A systematic and quantitative historical study of this
kind can yield lessons which not only help to understand today’s financial
disturbances better, but also to predict what can be expected in the future. For
instance, if history tells us that Spanish crises have become longer and deeper
over time, then one may suspect that the country’s present financial problems
are far from over and will take some years to be solved. Our paper also com-
pares the frequency, length and intensity of Spanish crises with the results
obtained in various cross-country studies that have used an ample data sample
of international crises. In particular, we contrast our empirical findings with
those of the comprehensive research conducted by Bordo et al. (2001).
1 We have not included debt crises. In a previous version of this paper (Betra´n et al. 2011), using
the ratio of total public debt to GDP, which includes domestic and international debt, we identified
debt crises in 1850, 1868-1882 and 1896-1909. Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) consider the following
external defaults in Spain: 1851, 1837-67, 1877-92 and, finally, the intervention of the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1959, 1960 and 1978 and the domestic default in 1936-1939. For a detailed
study of debt crises, please see Comı´n (2012).
2 Individual crises have been studied by Sa´nchez Albornoz (1963, 1967), Tortella (1973), Tedde
de Lorca (1974), Cuervo (1988), Martin-Acen˜a (2001), Navas and Sudria` (2007) and Nun˜o et al. (2011).
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In order to carry out this study, we gathered a comprehensive long-run
data set including financial and stock market variables. The sample covers
150 years, from 1850 to the present time. The sample has been divided into
four periods in order to compare the most recent years (1973-2000) with
more than a century of financial and stock market crises, distinguishing the
Bretton Woods period (1945-1972), the interwar years (1919-1935) and the
long second half of the 19th century (1850-1913)3.
Our main findings can be summarised as follows. On the whole, Spanish
crises have been more frequent than in the rest of the world. Second, crises
have been followed by recessions lasting an average of 2-4 years, a slightly
longer time span than those recorded for the international economy. Third,
Spanish crises have become more severe since 1973. Fourth, banking crises,
either on their own or in combination with currency and stock market crises,
were more prevalent during the interwar period than in any other. In con-
trast, currency crises were more frequent during the period 1945-1972, when
Spain was in the process of graduating as an industrial economy. Fifth, the
most severe crises are a combination of different types of crises, especially
the so-called triple crises. Sixth, the majority of Spanish crises have coin-
cided with international crises. Finally, the evidence referring to the post-
1973 period suggests, unfortunately, that crises have not only become more
frequent, but also more severe.
Section 2 identifies the banking, currency and stock market crashes.
Section 3 explores whether crises have become more frequent in Spain under
different macroeconomic frameworks and compares the Spanish record to
international experiences. We also ascertain whether or not Spanish crises
have coincided with international crises. Section 4 examines the duration
and depth of Spanish crises and the last section presents the conclusions4.
2. BANKING CRISES, CURRENCY CRISES AND STOCK
MARKET CRASHES
Banking crises are difficult to identify empirically, partly because of the
nature of the problem and partly due to the lack of relevant data (IMF 1998).
Although data on bank deposits are readily available for most countries and
could therefore be used to identify crises associated with runs on banks, most
banking problems in recent years have not derived from the liability side of
bank balance sheets. Banking crises generally stem from the asset side of
bank balance sheets — from a protracted deterioration in asset quality. This
suggests that variables such as the share of non-performing loans in bank
3 The sample interwar period ends in 1935 due to the beginning of the Spanish Civil War in
July 1936.
4 For a more detailed and comprehensive explanation of definitions, data procedures and
sources, see Betra´n et al. (2011).
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portfolios, large fluctuations in real estate and stock prices and indicators
of business failure could be used to identify crisis episodes. For instance,
Dermirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) consider that there is a banking
crisis when the ratio of non-performing assets to total assets in the banking
system exceeds 10 per cent or the cost of the rescue operation is at least
2 per cent of GDP; they also identify a banking crisis when banking sector
problems result in a large-scale nationalisation of banks, extensive bank runs
take place or emergency measures such as deposit freezes, prolonged bank
holidays or generalised deposit guarantees are enacted by the government in
response to the crisis. The difficulty is that information for such variables is
not readily available for many countries or is incomplete5. Given these lim-
itations, banking crises have usually been dated by researchers on the basis
of a combination of events, such as forced closure, mergers, government
takeovers of financial institutions, runs on banks or government assistance to
one or more financial institutions.
This paper uses both quantitative and qualitative information in order to
identify the main Spanish banking crises6. Although banking crises have
differed in nature and severity across countries and time, they typically
include one of the following three elements: (i) a high proportion of bank
failures; (ii) the failure of a particularly large or important bank; or
(iii) extraordinary or direct intervention on behalf of the government to
prevent failures. Friedman and Schwartz (1963) and Schwartz (1986) focus
on liquidity and assert that banking crises should be defined by changes in
the deposits-to-currency ratio. As deposits are withdrawn from banks in
favour of currency, banking crises are associated with sharp drops in the
deposit-to-currency ratio. Another way to detect a banking crisis is by
looking at the real stock prices of banks. For instance, Eichengreen and
Portes (1987) pointed out that disturbances in financial markets are usually
associated with falling asset prices.
In order to identify the main Spanish banking crises, we have made use of
three independent indicators, namely changes in the deposit-to-currency ratio,
bank real stock prices and the number of bank failures7. Table 1 shows the
results of combining the three indicators. Eight banking crises are identified
over the period: three in the 19th century (1866, 1881-1882, 1890) and the
other five in the 20th century (1913-14, 1920, 1924-25, 1931 and 1977)8. Not
surprisingly, many of these years are well known as the approximate dates of
international economic and financial crises, emphasising the connection
between the small Spanish economy and the international economy.
5 Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) admit that it is difficult to employ this approach in historical
analyses.
6 The qualitative information has been used by Kindleberger (2000), Bernanke and James
(1991) and Grossman (2010).
7 Data sources are listed in the Appendix.
8 The civil war years between 1936 and 1939 were also excluded from the sample period.
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TABLE 1
BANKING CRISES
Crisis year Real bank stock prices Number of banks(1)
Annual change in the deposit-to-
currency ratio at banking crisis
date to previous year(2)
Change in the deposit-to-
currency ratio in-between the
crises years(2)
1866 Peak: 1863 Suspension of payments:
Compan˜ı´a General de
Cre´dito (Madrid), and
Catalana General de
Cre´dito and Cre´dito
Mobiliario barcelone´s
(Barcelona)
1865-66: 20.45 1864-66: 20.49
Trough: 1866
Stock returns: 20.50
1881-82 Peak: 1882 Number of banks: 1882-87:
222 banks
1880-81: 20.087 1880-83: 20.30
Trough: 1883 1881-82: 20.20
Stock returns: 20.18
1890 Peak: 1890 Number of banks: 1890-92:
22 banks
1889-90: 20.18 1889-91: 20.10
Trough: 1892
Stock returns: 20.32
1913-14 Peak: 1910 Troubles in the Banco
Hispano Americano (1913)
and Cre´dito de la Unio´n
Minera (1914)
1912-13: 0.002 1913-14: 20.089
Trough: 1916 1913-14: 20.089
Stock returns: 20.44
1920 Peak: 1919 Suspension of payments:
Banco de Barcelona (1920)
1919-20: 0.06(3) 1920-21: 0.07(3)
Trough: 1920 1920-21: 0.07
Stock returns. 20.13
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TABLE 1 (Cont.)
1924-25 Peak: 1922 Troubles in the Cre´dito de la
Unio´n Minera (1925) and
Banco Central (1925)
1923-24: 20.075 1923-25: 20.08
Trough: 1924 1924-25: 20.005
Stock returns: 20.04
Number of Banks: 1924-25:
210 banks
1931 Peak: 1928 Suspension of payments:
Banco de Catalun˜a (1931)
1930-31: 20.18 1930-31: 20.18
Trough: 1932
Number of Banks:Stock returns: 20.4
1930: 23 and 1934-35: 24
banks
1977 na 24 banking institutions were
rescued
1976-77: 20.06 1976-78: 20.08
4 were liquidated
1977-78: 20.01
4 merged
20 small and medium banks
were nationalised
Notes: na: not available.
(1) Data on number of banks are different according to different sources for most of the period because there is no a banking directory including all the
banking institutions.
(2) From 1856 to 1872 we use the banknotes/currency ratio and from 1874 to 2000 the deposit-to-currency ratio.
(3) This indicator does not detect the 1920 crisis because it was caused by the problems of only one bank (Banco de Barcelona).
Source: See text and Data Appendix.
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A currency crisis may be said to occur when a speculative attack on the
exchange value of a currency results in a devaluation (or sharp depreciation),
or forces authorities to defend the currency by spending large amounts of
international reserves or by sharply raising interest rates. For example,
Frankel and Rose (1996) define a «currency crash» as a nominal depreciation
of the currency of at least 25 per cent in a year, along with a 10 per cent
increase in the rate of depreciation on the previous year9 and Reinhart
and Rogoff (2009) identify a currency crisis as an annual depreciation of
15 per cent or more of a currency with respect to a relevant anchor currency
or a reference country. However, Eichengreen et al. (1996, 1997) argue that
currency crises cannot be identified using actual devaluations, revaluations
and flotations, because speculative attacks are not always successful and
authorities can support the currency by spending central bank reserves or
raising interest rates. For this reason, they constructed a more sophisticated
index that not only considers exchange rate changes, but also movements in
international reserves or interest rate changes. They defined the index of
currency pressure as a weighted index made up of relative changes in the
nominal exchange rate, international reserves and interest rates10. The index
of market pressure is as follows:
EMPit ¼ ½ða%DeitÞþ ðbD ðiitiatÞÞ  ðgð%Drit%DratÞÞ
where eit is the exchange rate of a currency with respect to an anchor
currency, it is the short-term interest rate of the country considered, iat is the
short-term interest rate of an anchor country, r is the ratio of reserves (R) to
narrow money (M1) of the considered country to the anchor country and a, b
and g are the weights. A crisis is defined as an extreme value of the index:
Crisisit ¼1 if EMPit . 1:5 sEMP þmEMP
where sEMP and mEMP are the standard deviation and sample mean of EMP
(Exchange Market Pressure), respectively.
In order to identify the main Spanish currency crises we have computed
two alternative indicators: a simple index of exchange rate variations and a
weighted EMP index11. As in the case of the banking crises, quantitative data
have also been combined with other qualitative information. When using
9 This second condition is included so as to omit the strong trend of depreciations in high-
inflation countries from currency crashes.
10 Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) excluded interest rate differentials from their analysis of
currency and banking crises for 20 countries in Asia, Europe, South America and the Middle East
from 1970 to 1995.
11 The Eichengreen et al. (1996, 1997) index weights the variables by the ratio of the inverse of
their variation, but Li et al. (2006) consider that these weights have no clear economic interpreta-
tion, preferring to assign equal weights. According to these authors, the weights would depend on
the exchange rate regime (fixed or floating) and precise weights are a combination of market
volatility and policy reaction functions. The weighted EMP was estimated using different weights
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exchange rate variations, a currency crash was considered a nominal
depreciation of the currency of at least 15 per cent in a year (Reinhart and
Rogoff 2009). When a currency crisis appears in consecutive years, it is
treated as one sole currency crash. According to these criteria, we have
detected nine currency crises using the pound sterling/peseta exchange rate
from 1850 to 1913 and the US dollar/peseta exchange rate from 1914 to 2000.
Furthermore, the weighted EMP also identifies nine currency crises. The list
is presented in Table 2, which shows crises in 1882, 1899, 1931, 1943, 1958,
1976, 1982, 1991 and 199512.
In the case of stock market crashes, there are no clear definitions in the
literature. Patel and Sarkar (1998) define a stock market crash as a decline
in a stock price index, relative to the historical maximum, of more than
20 per cent for developed markets and more than 35 per cent for emerging
markets. Barro and Ursu´a (2009) consider there is a stock market crisis when
cumulative, multi-year returns are 20.250 or less of the stock price index.
The peak-to-trough method is applied to obtain the size of the declines13. We
define a stock market crash as a downturn in the stock price index of more
than 25 per cent from the nearest historical peak. For the 1850-1940 period
we have used a combination of stock prices in Madrid (mainly government
securities), Barcelona and Bilbao (basically private industrial and commer-
cial securities). After 1940, the index has been estimated using data from the
Madrid market, as it is the largest and also quotes both government debt
and shares of the major private industrial and commercial companies14.
According to this identification procedure, fourteen stock market crashes
have been detected, as shown in Tables 3 and 4.
As a crisis is always a complex phenomenon that in many instances
emerges as a consequence of a combination of events, we have also com-
puted four additional categories or types of crises. The combination of
currency and banking crises (twin 1 in our terminology) are the most widely
studied and significant of them all and refer to the simultaneous occurrence
of banking and balance-of-payments problems. The other two, namely
combinations of banking and stock market crises (twin 2) and currency and
stock market crises (twin 3), have received less attention, although we find
they provide extra information that is useful to understand the length and
severity of certain historical episodes. Finally, we believe it would also be of
interest to provide what can be labelled a «triple crisis», an unfortunate event
(F’note continued)
for four periods (1882-1913, 1914-35, 1942-72 and 1973-2000). The sources are listed in the
Appendix.
12 Banking crises were also recorded around 1882, 1931 and 1974-1975.
13 A Hodrick–Prescott filter has also been applied to attempt to gauge long run, as opposed to
transitory crises, but this reduced the number of stock market crises considerably, even in the case
of those normally considered in the literature. As a result, it was not used in this paper.
14 The sources are listed in the Appendix.
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that occurs when a country suffers a currency, banking and stock market
crisis at the same time.
3. CRISIS FREQUENCY
According to the standard definition, the frequency of a crisis is
the number of crises divided by the number of year observations, by period.
TABLE 2
CURRENCY CRISES
Crisis year Exchange rate EHE
EMP index different
weights by periods Spanish literature
1882 1883
1890
1892*
1899 1898 1899 1898
1921-22
1931 1931-32-33 1930 1931
1938
1943 1942 1943
1946-47-48
1950-51 1954* 1948-51
1958 1958 1958* 1958
1962*
1968 1967
1971
1976 1974-75
1978 1977
1982 1982-83-84 1982
1991 1991 1992
1995 1994 1995
1998
*Crises on the limit of acceptance.
Source: See text and Data Appendix.
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The exercise has been conducted for four periods (1850-1913, 1919-35, 1945-72
and 1973-2000) and the results are summarised in Figures 1 and 2. The bars on
the far left in Figure 1 indicate that after 1913, the combination of banking,
currency and stock market disruptions became more frequent. For the second
part of the 19th century and up to the First World War we found a frequency
rate of 11.1 per cent, only slightly more than half of that estimated for the
1919-1935 period (18.2 per cent) and also lower than the figure recorded for
1973-2000 (14.8 per cent). While not entirely comparable, as we have included
evidence for stock market crashes, our results are similar to those found by
Bordo et al. (2001) for their large sample of 21 countries15.
The interwar period is when the frequency of (all) crises was highest, a
conclusion similar to that obtained by Bordo et al. (2001) in their compre-
hensive study. Moreover, when comparing crisis frequency over the last two
periods, namely 1945-1972 and 1973-2000, a stark contrast emerges: an
TABLE 3
STOCK MARKET CRISES ACCORDING TO THE PEAK-TO-TROUGH METHOD
Year assigned to the stock market crisis Stock market period
1855 1852-59
1865 1861-69
1874 1871-74
1882 1881-87
1892 1890-92
1905 1902-06
1912 1910-14
1918 1915-22
1930 1928-34
na(1) 1935-40
1948 1947-50
1959 1956-60
1976 1974-80
1992 1989-92
Note: (1) Data not available because the stock market was closed throughout the Spanish Civil War.
Source: See text and Data Appendix.
15 Betra´n et al. (2011) also estimated frequency without stock market crises in order to make
our result comparable to Bordo et al. (2001) obtaining the same result.
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average frequency rate of 7.4 per cent compared with 14.8 per cent, which
suggests that, as in the rest of the world, the crisis problem has grown in
Spain since 1972. Furthermore, these same data suggest that in any given
TABLE 4
STOCK MARKET CRISES IN MADRID, BARCELONA AND BILBAO, 1850-2000
Number Peak Trough Stock returns
Madrid (1850-2000) 1 1861 1869 20.58
2 1871 1874 20.35
3 1890 1892 20.29
4 1902 1906 20.62
5 1910 1914 20.51
6 1915 1922 20.65
7 1928 1934 20.65
8 1935 1940 20.43(1)
9 1947 1950 20.62
10 1956 1960 20.35
11 1974 1980(2) 21.44
12 1989 1992(3) 20.33
Barcelona (1850-1936) 1 1852 1859 20.66
2 1861 1868 21.02
3 1881 1887 20.70
4 1889 1893 20.35
5 1916 1921 20.51
6 1928 1932 20.57
Bilbao (1891-1936) 1 1900 1902(4) 20.26
2 1912 1914 20.38
3 1919 1921 20.73
4 1928 1932 20.51
Total(5) 14 (we considered 1900-02 Bilbao crisis together with 1902-06
Madrid crisis)
Notes: Data for Madrid from 1850 to 2000, Barcelona 1850-1913 and Bilbao 1891-1936.
(1) There are no data; the returns are interpolated from Barro and Ursu´a (2009).
(2) Could be considered until 1982.
(3) Could be considered until 1994.
(4) Could be considered until 1904 as in the case of Madrid.
(5) Total refers to the crises that are in different years. The same stock market is considered when
crises occur in overlapping or adjacent years.
Source: See text and Data Appendix.
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year between 1919 and 2000, the chance of Spain suffering a currency,
banking or stock market crisis, or any combination of them was 1.5 points
higher than the world average (12.3 per cent vs. 10.8 per cent).
A combination of simultaneous crises rather than the occurrence of
a single crisis is what best explains the frequency rate in each period, as
FIGURE 1
CRISIS FREQUENCY (PER CENT FREQUENCY PER YEAR)
Source: See text and Data Appendix.
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Figure 2 demonstrates. Twin 2 (banking and stock market) crises and triple
(currency, banking and stock market) crises seem to have been the most
common form of economic turmoil in the pre-1913 and also post-1919
periods. This result is consistent with the qualitative evidence and should
not surprise researchers who are familiar with the literature on Spanish
FIGURE 2
CRISIS FREQUENCY (PER CENT FREQUENCY PER YEAR)
Source: See text and Data Appendix.
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financial history. Before 1936, bank failures and stock market crashes went
hand in hand and causality, in most instances, ran from the latter to the
former. In the interwar years, banking crises were frequent, although they
occurred in combination with the other two types of crises, causing the
overall rate of incidence to increase from 11.1 per cent to 18.2 per cent.
As elsewhere, banking crises were almost non-existent in the so-called
Bretton Woods years. One explanation given for this conspicuous absence is
that regulations in the Bretton Woods era were so restrictive and capital
flows were so low that there were no causes for banking crises (Goodhart
2007). The situation in Spain was similar16. The civil war broke out at a time
of financial self-regulation and the Franco regime prompted the imposition
of structural controls and a shift in bank supervision away from market
discipline and towards government discretion. As Pons (2002, 2012) argued,
the strong regulatory framework in the Franco era reduced the instability of
the banking system by sacrificing competition. Banks and saving banks in
difficulty were systematically rescued by the Bank of Spain and financially
sound banks with fiscal support and under the auspices of supervisory
authorities merged with and acquired banks in trouble. This was the other
alternative used to avoid bankruptcies. On the contrary, currency crises
emerged as a major source of economic turmoil. This result is obviously
similar to that documented for the international economy at large. Moreover,
as the repetition of stock market crashes was also common, the twin 3 type of
crisis is what explains why the rate of incidence in the years 1945-1972
remained as high as 7.4 per cent, on this occasion close to the world average
(7 per cent).
Figure 2 also clarifies that the frequency of currency crises combined with
banking and stock market crashes (twin 3 and triple) is responsible for such a
high rate of incidence since 1973. This is also consistent with our historical
knowledge of recent times. The peseta exchange rate suffered a series of
sharp devaluations in the 1970s and 1980s and did not escape the disruption
caused by the European exchange rate turbulence of 1992-1993 either.
3.1. Frequency and exchange regime, capital mobility, regulation
and economic development
In what follows we have linked the frequency of Spanish financial crises
to some factors that may explain it, including the exchange rate regime,
the degree of capital mobility, the regulatory framework and the level of
economic development. By relating these factors to crisis frequency, we seek
to detect any possible regularities and changes over time in order to identify
possible determinants of financial distress.
16 Betra´n and Pons (2012) explore the potential factors that could explain the depth or intensity
of the crises in Spain over the last 150 years.
FINANCIAL CRISES IN SPAIN: LESSONS FROM THE LAST 150 YEARS
Revista de Historia Econo´mica, Journal of lberian and Latin American Economic History 431
The 1850-1913 years were characterised by a floating exchange rate
regime (Spain never adopted the gold standard), the absence of capital
controls and a lack of regulation in the financial system. The main features of
the interwar period were a (dirty) floating exchange rate regime, capital
controls and a weakly regulated banking system. As elsewhere, from 1945-1972
the prevailing elements of the Spanish regime were a fixed exchange rate with
capital controls and a strictly regulated financial system. The last period, on the
contrary, exhibited completely the opposite characteristics with a flexible
exchange rate, no capital controls and a deregulated financial system17.
The evidence suggests two different patterns. The 65 years of nearly clean
floating exchange rates from 1850 to 1913 coincided with a period during
which (all) crises were relatively less frequent. In contrast, during the dirty
floating regime that characterised the interwar years, crisis frequency, whether
single or mixed, increased substantially. Furthermore, an increase in crisis
frequency is observed in the last two periods, when the peseta exchange rate
was left to float. It seems as if the change in the exchange rate regime did not
impinge on the frequency of crises. Hence, there are two periods with a
floating exchange rate (1850-1913 and 1973-2000) that recorded different
results in terms of crisis frequency. A similar situation occurs with capital
controls. If we compare the two periods with unrestricted capital mobility
(1850-1913 and 1973-2000), we observe relatively high crisis frequency
(11.1 and 14.8, respectively). However, the two periods with capital controls
(1919-1935 and 1945-1972) witnessed very different frequency rates. In fact,
they registered the highest and lowest frequency, respectively.
Results are different when we relate financial regulation with crisis
frequency. In this period, four distinct regulatory regimes are identified: «the
liberal era» (1856-1920), the «self-regulated era» (1921-1936), when there
was a change in regulation and supervision was entrusted to the banks
themselves, the «interventionist period» (1939-1975), when there was an
abrupt shift in regulation and competition was replaced by government
discretion, and the post Bretton Woods era (1975-2000), which was a period
of liberalisation and deregulation (Martı´n-Acen˜a et al. 2009). In the «liberal»
and «self-regulated» eras, Spain suffered from financial crises more frequently
(11.1 per cent and 18.8 per cent, respectively) than in the interventionist
period (7.47 per cent). Moreover, the liberalisation that began at the end of the
1960s was also accompanied by an increase in crisis frequency (14.8 per cent
in the period 1973-2000). In this sense, we can affirm, as mentioned in the
previous section, that a more regulated system can reduce the probability of
suffering a financial crisis, especially banking crises.
However, there have not only been changes in the exchange and currency
regimes and regulation over these 150 years, but also in the economic
17 For the different Spanish exchange rate regimes, Eguidazu (1978), Martı´nez Ruiz (2003) and
Serrano Sanz and Asensio Castillo (1997).
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position of the country. Spain progressed from underdevelopment, before
1913, becoming an emerging country between 1919 and 1972, before finally
being considered an industrial economy thereafter. In the literature, there is
no consensus regarding the relationship between economic development and
crisis frequency. Bordo et al. (2001) argued that crisis frequency is con-
centrated in developing countries (which tend to be younger, smaller and
less developed). However, they did mention one prominent exception,
namely the Great Depression in the 1930s. Now, the 2007 crises can also be
added to that exception. Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) maintain that emerging
countries have more external default crises and inflation crises, but banking
crises and currency crises are a recurring phenomenon in both developed
and emerging economies.
The pattern of crisis frequency in Spain over these 150 years resembles
the international trend and we cannot find a clear relationship between
the changes in economic development and crisis frequency. When Spain
progressed from its initial backward status in the 19th and very early
20th century to an emerging economy in the early decades of the 20th century,
crises became more recurrent, as was the case with the world average.
However, during the period 1945-1972 when Spain was still an emerging
country, crisis regularity dropped. The opposite happened in the last period
when the Spanish economy achieved developed country status, as there was
a sharp increase in crisis frequency. Consequently, there does not seem to be
a clear-cut relationship between economic development and crisis frequency
in Spain.
3.2. Spanish financial crises and contagion
The task of defining international contagion and transmission channels
is complex. A number of theoretical and empirical models focus on trans-
mission through trade linkage (Eichengreen et al. 1996), while others
emphasise the significance of financial market linkage, mainly through
capital flows (Kaminsky et al. 2003). Information is a third means of crisis
contagion when economic fundamentals are common among markets that
share similar features (Allen and Gale 2007; Reinhart and Rogoff 2009). The
empirical results of these models are not conclusive18. For instance, Reinhart
and Rogoff (2009) argue that crises in the centre do not always affect the
18 Eichengreen et al. (1996) reach the conclusion that trade linkages explain the transmission of
financial crises in twenty industrial countries from 1959 to 1993, whereas Bordo (1986) argues that
monetary variables such as gold flows and changes in international reserves were the main trans-
mission mechanisms of financial crises from 1870 to 1933. Kaminsky et al. (2003) also centre on
financial linkages, in particular on the role of capital flows and the existence of common creditors or
common lenders among potentially affected countries. However, the analysis by Neal and
Weidenmier (2003) before and after the gold standard raises serious doubts that contagion was an
important feature.
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global economy. In what follows we have simply attempted to ascertain how
many Spanish financial crises have coincided with international financial
crises. The dates for the latter have been taken from the well-known studies
by Bordo et al. (2001), Neal and Weidenmier (2003), Reinhart and Rogoff
(2009) and Marichal (2010).
The first column in Table 5 shows the eighteen Spanish financial crises
we have identified in this paper and the second column lists the main
world financial crises. In the period 1850-1913, we observe that of the
seven Spanish crises recorded by our database, four match the international
financial crises of 1866, 1874, 1882 and 1892. Hence, it can be said that
in this period contagion was relatively common since the probability
of a Spanish crisis overlapping with a world crisis was about 57 per cent.
In the interwar period, the probability of contagion was even higher at
75 per cent, since three of the Spanish domestic crises, 1914, 1921 and 1931
coincided with the international crises that plagued the world economy
around the same time. On the contrary, during the Bretton Woods era, the
Spanish crises were entirely domestic and no contagion whatsoever is found.
Finally, for the last period, 1973-2000, all Spanish crises coincide with the
international crises.
All in all, what Table 5 highlights is that, on the one hand, eleven out of
the eighteen Spanish financial crises concur with corresponding world
financial crises, which is a probability of coincidence of 61 per cent. On
the other hand, Table 5 also shows that both in the interwar years and in the
most recent period when international crises have been frequent, they have
also been recurrent in Spain.
4. DURATION AND DEPTH OF CRISES
Recovery time is defined as the number of years until GDP growth returns
to its pre-crisis trend. By definition, minimum recovery time is 1 year. The
depth or severity of a crisis is the cumulative loss of output estimated by
adding the differences between trend growth and output growth after the
crisis until the time when annual output growth returns to its trend.
Quantifying the length and depth of a crisis is not a simple task, as it
requires calculating the growth trend of the economy and defining the pre-
crisis period (3, 5 or more years of normal growth) to compare with actual
growth during the crisis. The IMF (1998) resorts to the GDP growth rate for
the 3 years preceding the event, while Bordo et al. (2001) calculates the GDP
growth rate over the 5 years preceding the event. As considering 3 or 5 years
to determine the pre-crisis trend is an ad hoc solution and, moreover, the
years prior to financial crises are in most cases characterised by an expansion
or extra-growth, this paper takes a different approach. The growth trend in
this case derives directly from the different phases of growth computed by
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TABLE 5
SPANISH CRISES AND CRISES AT INTERNATIONAL CENTER
Crisis year Spanish crises
Number of
events Crises at international center
Number of events
when crises at
international centers
also occurred
1855 Stock market
1866 Twin 2 (banking1 stock market) Failure of Overend, Gurney & Co
in London
1874 Stock market German and Austrian stock
markets collapse, May 1873
1882 Triple (currency1banking1 stock market) Banking panic and stock market
crash in Paris
1892(1) Twin 2 (banking1 stock market) Baring Crisis, 1890.
1899 Currency
1905 Stock market
1850-1913 7 4
1914 Twin 2 (banking1 stock market) First World War financial crisis
1921 Twin 2 (banking1 stock market) Post First World War crisis
1924 Banking
1931 Triple (currency1banking1 stock market) 1929-31 Wall Street stock market
crash and banking crises
1919-35 4 3
1943 Currency
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TABLE 5 (Cont.)
Crisis year Spanish crises
Number of
events Crises at international center
Number of events
when crises at
international centers
also occurred
1948 Stock market
1958 Twin 3 (currency1 stock market)
1945-72 3 0
1976 Triple (currency1banking1 stock market) UK and US currency crises
1982 Currency UK and US currency crises
1991 Twin 3 (currency1 stock market) UK and US currency crises
1995 Currency UK and US currency crises
1973-2000 4 4
Note: Twin 1 is a combination of currency and banking crises. Twin 2 is a combination of banking and stock market crises. Twin 3 is a combination
of currency and stock market crises. Triple is a combination of currency, banking and stock market crises.
(1) 1892 stock market crisis and 1890 banking crisis. In the period 1919-35 we have included the 1914 crisis and in the 1945-72 period the 1943 crisis.
Sources: for Spain, see text and Data Appendix and for the international crises, Bordo et al. (2001), Neal and Weidenmier (2003), Reinhart and Rogoff
(2009) and Marichal (2010).
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Prados de la Escosura (2003). This author estimated average growth rates for
periods delimited by 2 peak years. This alternative was chosen because
the 3- or 5-year average growth rate for Spain was not sufficiently repre-
sentative of the long-term growth rate. Potential growth is better captured by
the growth rate of a full cycle, as defined by Prados de la Escosura (2003).
Our calculations are shown in Table 6. For «all crises» it seems obvious
that the worst performance was recorded in the last period. The pre-crisis
growth rate took longer (double the time) to recover than in any of the other
three periods. In fact, recovery took as long as 4 years compared with an
TABLE 6
DURATION AND DEPTH
1850-1913 1919-35 1945-72 1973-2000
Average duration of the crisis in years
All crises 2.86 1.75 2.33 4
Banking 1
Currency 1 1 3.50
Stock market 1.67 3
Twin 1 (curr1bank)
Twin 2 (bank1 stock) 4 1.5
Twin 3 (curr1 stock) 3 4
Triple (curr1bank1 stock) 6 3 5
Average crisis depth (cumulative GDP loss %)
All crises 8.04 4.12 5.85 14.33
Banking 0
Currency 0.25 0 12.55
Stock market 6.48 7.97
Twin 1 (curr1bank)
Twin 2 (bank1 stock) 11.52 1.73
Twin 3 (curr1 stock) 9.57 6.25
Triple (curr1bank1 stock) 13.52 13.04 25.97
Notes: Twin 1 is a combination of currency and banking crises. Twin 2 is a combination of banking and
stock market crises. Twin 3 is a combination of currency and stock market crises. Triple is a combination
of currency, banking and stock market crises.
Source: See text and Data Appendix.
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average of around 2 years for the other three periods. Moreover, post-1973
crises have not only lasted longer, but have also been more severe, with a
cumulative GDP loss as high as 14.3 per cent, nearly twice that of 1850-1813
and nearly three times the output losses in the interwar and Bretton Woods
years. This result is in sharp contrast to the conclusions reached by Bordo
et al. (2001), for whom crises had grown more frequent but not more severe
after 1973 (Tables 7 and 8). The difference can be explained by the extra-
ordinary severity of the crises (currency, twin 3 and triple crises) that
occurred in the late 1970s. This was partly due to the impact of the deep
industrial recession that took place during the transition from a dictatorship
to democracy, and also to the slow adaptation of the Spanish economy to the
more open and integrated economy of the former European Community19.
Another salient feature of Table 6 is the relative mildness of the interwar
crises in absolute terms and when compared with the international experience
(Table 8). Duration was shorter and output losses (all crises) lower than in any
TABLE 7
CRISIS FREQUENCY
Spain World(1)
1850-1913 11.1 1880-1913 4.9
1919-35 18.8 1919-39 13.2
1945-72 7.4 1945-71 7.0
1973-2000 14.8 1973-97(2) 12.2
Notes: (1) Figure for 21-country sample.
(2) Figure for 56-country sample.
Source: See text and Data Appendix.
TABLE 8
OUTPUT LOSS (%)
Spain World(1)
1850-1913 8 1880-1913 9.8
1919-35 4.1 1919-39 13.4
1945-72 5.8 1945-71 5.2
1973-2000 14.3 1973-97(2) 8.3
Notes: (1) Figure for 21-country sample.
(2) Figure for 56-country sample.
Source: See text and Data Appendix.
19 The high output losses are also due to the abnormal and extraordinary growth rates achieved
by the Spanish economy in previous periods.
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of the other three periods. Industrial backwardness, financial isolation and
the sharp depreciation of the exchange rate of the peseta against all major
international currencies may explain this marked difference. There were three
(not very severe) banking crises between 1913 and 1936 and a triple crisis in
1931 (with greater repercussions). However, if only the 1931 triple crisis is
considered, findings are similar to those obtained by Bordo et al. (2001).
More detailed information is presented in Table 9, which lists the duration
and depth of crises by year and type. The longest and deepest were the triple
and currency crashes in 1976 and 1982, respectively. Complete recovery
required a full decade and cumulative output loss peaked at 25.97 per cent and
23.62 per cent, respectively. The other two major disturbances date back to the
19th century, namely the banking crisis in 1866 and the triple crisis in 1882.
Both caused a cumulative GDP loss of around 13 per cent.
The ranking (in brackets) of crises in terms of the largest output loss is as
follows: 1866 (6), 1882 (3), 1892 (5), 1931 (4), 1976 (1) and 1982 (2), triple
crises being recorded in 1882, 1931 and 1976 (see Table 9).
As shown above, the most severe Spanish crises have been a combination
of different types of crises, mainly triple crises, the only exceptions being the
1874 and 1948 stock market crises and the 1982 currency crisis20. According
to Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), banking crises have usually been predated
by currency crises, but when both occur together the impact on economic
activity is greater than when they happen separately. Moreover, stock market
crises are also more severe when they coincide with a currency and/or a
banking crisis. The impact of a stock market collapse spreads to the banking
sector and finally becomes a currency crisis. Although banking crises often
precede currency crises, there are obvious common factors behind both of
them and it has been proven that currency problems aggravate banking
problems and vice versa. The results obtained in this paper for Spanish
financial crises confirm these findings.
5. CONCLUSIONS
This paper presents a wealth of quantitative information in order to
identify a large number and various types of financial crises. A total of
eighteen crises of various classes and combinations have been detected over
the last 150 years. All crises seem to have been more frequent in Spain than
in the world sample studied by Bordo et al. (2001). Crises have been followed
by recessions lasting on average 2-4 years, which is a slightly longer period
than the international average of 2-3 years. Worldwide crises recorded an
average cumulative output loss of 9.2 per cent, while in the particular case of
Spain the figure was 8.1 per cent, a small difference that can be attributed to
20 The 1982 currency crisis, however, could be linked to the 1976 triple crisis.
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TABLE 9
DURATION AND DEPTH OF CRISES IN SPAIN BY YEAR AND TYPE OF CRISIS
CONSIDERING ALL TYPES OF CRISES
Crisis year Type of crisis
Average
duration in
years
Average depth
(cumulative
GDP loss %)
1855 Stock market 3 5.62
1866 Twin 2 (banking1 stock market) 3 11.28
1874 Stock market 1 10.58
1882 Triple (currency1banking1 stock market) 6 13.52
1892(1) Twin 2 (banking1 stock market) 5 11.77
1899 Currency 1 0.25
1905 Stock market 1 3.24
1850-1913 2.83 8.04
1914 Twin 2 (banking1 stock market) 2 3.46
1921 Twin 2 (banking1 stock market) 1 0
1924 Banking 1 0
1931 Triple (currency1banking1 stock market) 3 13.04
1919-35 1.75 4.12
1943 Currency 1 0
1948 Stock market 3 7.97
1958 Twin 3 (currency1 stock market) 3 9.57
1945-72 2.33 5.85
1976 Triple (currency1banking1 stock market) 5 25.97
1982 Currency 5 23.62
1991 Twin 3 (currency1 stock market) 4 6.25
1995 Currency 2 1.48
1973-2000 4 14.33
Notes: Twin 1 is a combination of currency and banking crises. Twin 2 is a combination of banking and
stock market crises. Twin 3 is a combination of currency and stock market crises. Triple is a combination
of currency, banking and stock market crises. In the period 1919-35 we have included the 1914 crisis and in
the 1945-72 period the 1943 crisis.
(1) 1892 stock market crisis and 1890 banking crisis.
Source: See text and Data Appendix.
CONCHA BETRA´N/PABLO MARTI´N-ACEN˜A/MARI´A A. PONS
440 Revista de Historia Econo´mica, Journal of lberian and Latin American Economic History
the milder impact of the interwar period crises, as shown in Table 6. On the
contrary, the losses recorded in the last period were greater in Spain than at
international level.
Banking crises, either on their own or in combination with currency and
stock market crises, were more prevalent during the interwar period than in
any other. In contrast, currency crises took place more often during the period
1945-1972, when Spain was in the process of graduating as an industrial
country. The rapid transformation of the economy during the 1950s and 1960s
with high import requirements of raw materials and intermediate goods
caused repetitive balance of payments disequilibria, exerting strong pressure
on the exchange rate. In general, banking and stock market crises and their
combinations were more frequent in the first two periods (1850-1913 and
1919-1935), while currency crises and their combinations were more common
in the second two periods (1945-1972 and 1973-2000).
The frequency rate of Spanish financial crises has remained high from
1913 onwards. Financial crises have also become more severe as we passed
from the 19th to the 20th century, although the explanation lies in the cata-
strophic impact of the financial crises in 1976-1982. In summary, Spanish
crises have become more frequent, more severe and last, on average, longer
than in the rest of the world. History thus warns that there is something
disturbing about our economy.
Banking crises, currency crises and twin crises are hardy perennial, to
echo the celebrated aphorism in Goodhart and Delargy (1998): plus ça
change, plus c0est la meme chose. Spain is not different: we have lived with
and through recurrent financial crises for the last 150 years. Crises have
occurred under distinctive exchange and currency regimes, with and without
capital controls and independently of the level of development of the
economy. The only variable that has significantly reduced the frequency of
crises is regulation. The most interventionist period (1945-1972) recorded
the lowest crisis frequency. There were no banking crises during this period,
although competition was sacrificed in favour of stability.
For «all crises» it seems obvious that the worst performance has been
recorded in the most recent period. The pre-crisis growth rate has taken
longer (double the time) to recover than in any of the other three periods.
In fact, recovery took as long as 4 years compared with an average of around
2 years for the other three periods. Moreover, post-1973 crises have not only
lasted longer, but have also been more severe, with a cumulative GDP loss as
high as 14.3 per cent, nearly twice that of 1850-1813 and nearly three times
the output losses in the interwar and Bretton Woods years. This result is in
sharp contrast to the conclusions reached by Bordo et al. (2001), for whom
crises had grown more frequent but not more severe after 1973 (Table 9).
The difference can be explained by the extraordinary severity of the crises
(currency, twin 3 and triple crises) that occurred in the late 1970s. Moreover,
some of the most severe crises (1976, 1882 and 1931) were combinations of
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different types of crises; in fact they were triple crises and consequently, this
result is in line with Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), who maintain that when
currency and banking crises occurred jointly, their impact on economic
activity was greater than when they took place separately. Finally, in
QJ;Spain the periods with highest frequency of financial crises coincided
with international distress.
Crises have been costly and this conclusion has relevant policy implica-
tions. The authorities should be aware of the fact that if crises brought about
output losses in the past, future crises will most likely deliver the same
poison. The first lesson is that authorities should have a strategy prepared to
face (expected and unexpected) economic disturbances and to minimise
their cost. Moreover, they should also have policy programmes aimed at
shortening the length of crises and speeding up recovery.
The 2007 crisis confirms our results about the rising severity and com-
plexity of Spanish financial crises. We are once again involved in a triple
crisis with some peculiar characteristics. First, there has been a very severe
banking crisis, although in this case savings banks have played the leading
role. Second, although we have not experienced a currency crisis, the crisis
in the euro has been one of the main consequences of the 2007 turmoil,
revealing some of the weaknesses in the construction of the common cur-
rency. In fact, at present the future of the euro is uncertain. Finally, despite
not crashing, the stock market has declined sharply since 2007. The stock
market index (IBEX) recorded its historical maximum (15,945.7 points)
on November 8, 2007, but had fallen by 52 per cent in September 2011
(7,640.7) and the trend has continued over the last few months (around 6,999
points at the end of April 2012). Therefore, the recent evolution of the
Spanish financial system shows that the probability of suffering a combi-
nation of different kinds of crises is increasing and, consequently, the depth
and complexity of financial crises has risen not only in the last part of the
20th century, but also at the beginning of the 21st century.
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DATA APPENDIX
Banking crises
For nominal bank stock prices, Hoyo (2007). For the number of banks,
Tortella (1973) for the period 1850-1875, Tedde de Lorca (1974) for the
period 1875-1913, EHE (Carreras and Tafunell 2005) for the period 1939-
1975 and Pueyo (2003) for the period 1942-1995. Bankruptcies and other
qualitative information in Martı´n-Acen˜a et al. (2009). Banking profitability,
bank deposits and prices in EHE (Carreras and Tafunell 2005).
Currency crises
Exchange rates and interest rates have been taken from EHE (Carreras
and Tafunell 2005). Data for the United Kingdom and the United States from
Homer and Sylla (2005). Reserve variations from Martı´n-Acen˜a (1985) and
Prados de la Escosura (2010). Reserve variations for the United Kingdom,
Accominotti et al. (2011) for the period 1881-1911 and 1912-1944, Mitchell
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(1998). Balance of payments data from Mitchell (1994) are used for the rest
of the years (1912-1994). Finally, for the United States, data from the balance
of payments provided by US Historical Statistics (Carter et al. 2006) (1874-
1998) were used.
Stock market crises
Data sources for Madrid and Barcelona are the EHE (Carreras and
Tafunell 2005) (1850-1913) and Hortala´ (2006) for 1913 to 1936 and Houpt
and Rojo-Cagival (2010) for Bilbao.
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